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Abstract 
Cost-effective implementation of measures to conserve biodiversity is often a major target of conservation 
organisations, and choosing the correct mode of governance can be important in this context. Nature conservation 
organisations can, in principle, choose between two distinct modes of governance to implement conservation 
activities: they can (1) buy desired areas of interest and implement conservation measures themselves (buy option), 
or (2) offer payments to landowners to incentivize them to voluntarily preserve or create habitat on their land 
(compensation option). In this paper we analyse the cost-effectiveness of these two modes of governance in a case 
study on a conservation project in a Natura 2000 area in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany. The actual costs of the 
buying option are compared with the potential costs of implementing the compensation option. We developed a 
costing framework to compare the costs of both options over time, given they generate the same ecological results 
on an identical project area. We find that the cost-effective solution depends, among other things, on the 
conservation timeframe considered and on cost components such as transaction costs, leasehold rent and land 
prices.  
This is a pre-print of an article published in Biodiversity and Conservation. The final 
authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10531-017-1496-4 
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1 Introduction 
Conservation funds are scarce. Conservation agencies therefore need to use their funds cost-effectively, i.e. 
they must select conservation options which maximise the achievement of their conservation goals with the 
financial resources available (Birner and Wittmer 2004; Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005; Ferraro and Pattanayak 
2006; Naidoo and Ricketts 2006). Suggestions for improving the cost-effectiveness of conservation policy 
instruments have hitherto focussed mainly on improving the spatial allocation of conservation measures. Examples 
of this type of research include Polasky et al. (2008), Van Teeffelen et al. (2012), and Duke et al. (2013), for 
conservation planning, and Armsworth et al. (2012), Wätzold and Drechsler (2014) and Wätzold et al. (2016), for 
conservation payments. Other research compared the cost-effectiveness of a proactive conservation policy with a 
policy that only sets in when a species is nearly extinct (Drechsler et al. 2011), the cost-effectiveness of integrating 
borrowing and budget carry-over in land acquisition strategies by conservation organisations (Lennox et al. 2017) 
and the participation of private versus public land owners in conservation contracts (Hily et al. 2015). 
A hitherto neglected area of research to enhance the cost-effectiveness of conservation policy instruments is 
the choice of the relevant mode of governance for an area of conservation interest and of the management options 
implemented on that area (Juutinen et al. 2008; Muradian and Rival 2012; Schöttker et al. 2016). In this context it 
is important to ask whether it is more cost-effective for nature conservation agencies to (1) buy desired areas of 
interest and implement conservation measures themselves or through closely monitored firms (buy option), or (2) 
offer payments to landowners to incentivize them to voluntarily preserve or create habitat on their land 
(compensation option) (Curran et al. 2016; Schöttker et al. 2016).  
This question is related to the “make-or-buy decision” originally investigated in the context of the theory of 
the firm and the field of transaction cost economics (Coase 1937; Williamson 1975). The general make-or-buy 
decision addresses the question of whether firms should produce some of their (intermediate) products themselves, 
i.e. internal provision, or instead purchase the same product from another company, i.e. external provision. In the 
context of nature conservation, internal provision can be seen as the management of nature conservation sites 
through nature conservation agencies on land that was originally bought by the agency and by measures performed 
by the agency itself or closely monitored by it. External provision on the other hand is equal to a provision of the 
same conservation outcome by the same conservation measures only performed by a firm or an individual outside 
the conservation agency but contracted and paid by the agency (compare Klein 2008). Research related to the 
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make-or-buy decision in nature conservation is rare. Schöttker et al. (2016) apply an ecological-economic model 
to analyse how ecological and economic parameters of the decision problem influence the cost-effectiveness 
ranking of the two options. Juutinen et al. (2008) compare costs for forest conservation through conservation 
contracts and land purchase in Finland, and Curran et al. (2016) compare costs of hypothetical land purchase and 
costs of a payments for ecosystem services (PES) scheme for forest conservation in Central Kenya.  
Here, we aim to contribute to this small but growing research area and present a further empirical study on 
the make-or-buy decision in nature conservation. We analyse the cost-effectiveness of the buy option compared 
with the compensation option for the conservation of an oligotrophic lake in a Natura 2000 area in Schleswig-
Holstein, Germany. We calculate the actual costs incurred for buying land at the conservation site and managing 
it for the purpose of reducing nutrient input from the surrounding agricultural areas from 1980 until 2015. We then 
compare these costs with the hypothetical costs of compensating farmers for applying the same management which 
enables us to derive the cost-effective solution. Our study differs from those of Juutinen et al. (2008) and Curran 
et al. (2016) in several ways. We analyse conservation on agricultural land whereas they focus on forest 
conservation, this implies for example, that forest management leads to a more long-term costing framework, while 
our research considers a rather short-term costing framework. Moreover, we carry out an ex post analysis whereas 
their studies are of a prospective nature. This enables us to assess the impact of real world events on the cost-
effectiveness of the two options such as the shift to the production of energy crops in Germany (Dauber et al. 
2016).  
2 Materials and methods 
2.1 Case study description 
2.1.1 Conservation problem 
The conserved area around Lake Bültsee covers approximately 71 ha in the federal state of Schleswig-
Holstein, Germany (Figure 1). It consists of the approximately 20 ha sized lake and a surrounding grassland area 
of approximately 51 ha (Kämmer 2002). The area is located about 35 km northwest of the federal state’s capital, 
Kiel, and close to Eckernförde Bay. It was purchased gradually from 1980 to 2011 to establish a conservation site 
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at and around the lake. Lake Bültsee and the surrounding littoral zone was declared a nature conservation site in 
1982. It is embedded in the German Natura 2000 network “Naturpark Schlei” and the FFH area “Großer 
Schnaaper See, Bültsee und anschließende Flächen” (FFH DE 1524-391). 
 
Figure 1: Lake Bültsee conservation area in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany, with its different terrain and 
grassland types (see online version for colour version). The map is based on ArcGIS map data Europe NUTS 
1, management plan data for the FFH area “Großer Schnaaper See, Bültsee und anschließende Flächen”, 
and data from SNSH. 
Lake Bültsee is a kettle hole which was formed during the Weichselian glacial period as an oligotrophic, i.e. 
nutrient-poor, glacial lake. The surrounding area consists of sandy soils which strongly determine the nutritional 
supplement and supply of the lake. Past farming activities, especially intensive farming in the 20th century, led to 
a strong increase in the nutrient supply – i.e. the concentration of NOx and other fertilizer-induced nutrients. This 
transformed the lake from poor to medium nutrient levels (mesotrophic). The lake is surrounded by fields used for 
agriculture, which add a strong nutrient supply to the lake by surface water drainage and pollution of the 
groundwater by fertilizers. 
The main conservation target is to re-establish an oligotrophic lake with a corresponding surrounding 
ecosystem of specially adapted fauna, e.g. the water lobelia (Lobelia dortmanna), quillworts (Isoetes lacustris) or 
the European shore-weed (Littorella uniflora) and a generally nutrient-poor regime of the surrounding dry 
grassland. The first two species are protected under the German Federal Nature Conservation Act (BNatSchG) as 
endangered native species, while the third species is not protected but considered endangered. Since 1996, an 
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extensive cattle grazing regime is implemented on the area under conservation. A herd of Galloway cattle grazes 
on the grassland and littoral zone, thereby effectively reducing unwanted growth of vegetation around the lake and 
thus improving the growth of target species in the littoral zone through reduced nutrient intake into the lake. The 
cattle graze throughout the year, without being fed additionally and without additional external supply of fertilizers. 
In 1995, as an initial conservation measure, willow and alder trees were removed. In 1996, this was repeated and 
additionally, any excessive growth of vegetation along the southern shoreline was mowed or kept low with the 
help of sheep grazing to allow the target fauna to grow unimpeded. In 1996, the management of the littoral 
grassland was changed from extensive sheep grazing to extensive cattle grazing (Kämmer 2002). 
2.1.2 Conservation actors 
The conservation project is implemented by a government-funded but independent nature conservation 
foundation, Stiftung Naturschutz Schleswig-Holstein (SNSH), which buys and administratively manages land for 
nature conservation purposes in the federal state of Schleswig-Holstein, Germany. SNSH was founded in 1978 
with the goal of managing areas used for agriculture or forestry in order to establish environmental or biodiversity 
protection. For this purpose, SNSH leases or buys areas at the public land-market. These areas are then withdrawn 
from their original use and transferred into (permanent) conservation sites. SNSH owns a total of over 35,000 ha 
in Schleswig-Holstein, of which our case study area, represents only a small, but one of the oldest fractions 
(Stiftung Naturschutz Schleswig Holstein 2015). 
The extensive grazing management is operated by a contractor, Bunde Wischen e.V. (BW). BW is a registered 
association founded in 1986 in the context of a local project for orchid protection through the implementation of 
extensive grassland measures. BW manages over 700 ha of agricultural land in Schleswig-Holstein for the purpose 
of organic farming and nature conservation (Kämmer 2002). BW leased the land around Lake Bültsee from SNSH 
and implements the measures prescribed by SNSH. BW does not receive compensation payments from SNSH for 
implementing the prescribed measure, however it qualifies for AES funding for extensive grassland measures. BW 
keeps the economic profit generated on the area. Only in recent years, leasehold payments are paid from BW to 
SNSH. 
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2.2 Data Collection 
Together with SNSH and BW, data were gathered on the actual costs and financial outlays regarding the 
purchase and management of the conservation area at Lake Bültsee conservation site. The data contains detailed 
information on buying costs and side costs, i.e. notary fees, taxes, and measurement costs, from 1980 to 2011. 
Third party data was used to estimate the costs of the hypothetical compensation option, i.e. the profitability of 
agricultural land under intensive and extensive management and the resulting compensation payment. A literature 
research revealed further data on transaction costs, land prices and interest and discount rate estimates. Some data 
gaps, especially in the profitability datasets, were filled using German consumer price index-based interpolation. 
2.3 Costs of the buy option 
2.3.1 Cost function  
The total costs of the project from year 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 to a given end-year 𝑇, expressed in values of the year 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡, can be 
calculated with equations (1a) and (1b): 
𝐶𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑏𝑢𝑦 = ( ∑ 𝑑𝑡(𝑝𝑡 + 𝜙𝑡 + 𝑚𝑡 + 𝑎𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
) + (−𝑣𝑇
𝑒𝑥𝑡 + 𝑠𝑇)𝑑𝑇                         (1𝑎) 
with 
𝑑𝑡 = {
1                                    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
(1 + 𝑖𝑡−1)
−1 𝑑𝑡−1           ∀ 0 < 𝑡 < 𝑇
                                 (1𝑏) 
where 𝑑𝑡 is the discount factor for the year 𝑡, 𝑝𝑡  the sum of the purchasing prices of all parcels of land bought, 𝜙𝑡 
the side costs of purchasing the parcels, 𝑚𝑡 the annual agricultural costs of managing the purchased parcels in a 
desired way, 𝑎𝑡  the administrative management costs, 𝑙𝑡  the leasehold income gathered from third party 
contractors, all in year 𝑡. The value of conserved land is 𝑣𝑇
𝑒𝑥𝑡 , 𝑠𝑇 = ∑  𝜙𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡  the side costs of selling the 
land, both in year 𝑇, and 𝑖𝑡 the real market interest rate (based on the yield of German government bonds with 
longer than 4 years maturity). 
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We assume that the extensive grassland value 𝑣𝑇
𝑒𝑥𝑡 is proportional to the intensive agricultural land value 𝑣𝑇
𝑖𝑛𝑡 
(Ciaian et al. 2010; USDA 2015) and thus  
𝑣𝑇
𝑒𝑥𝑡 = 𝜃 𝑣𝑇
𝑖𝑛𝑡  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝜃 ≤ 1.                                                    (2) 
To calculate the costs of the buy option, we subtract the value of the extensive grassland in year T from the 
cumulative costs of buying the land in the respective timeframe and add selling side costs 𝑠𝑇 (see eq. (1a)). This 
step is necessary to establish comparability with the hypothetical compensation scheme in which land is reused 
for possible intensive agriculture after a conservation contract terminates. 
2.3.2 Actual costs of land acquisition and management 
The costs of land acquisition including side costs from 1980 until 2011 are provided in Table 1. The annual 
administrative costs of managing the conservation site are relatively small. Furthermore, they cannot be accounted 
for directly, as the relevant employees are responsible for multiple projects. SNSH estimates annual expenses for 
personnel of 970 € and travel costs of 72 €. 
 buying  costs side costs area in ha 
1980 207,073.21 € 56,313.56 € 17.6 
1981 229,600.22 € 49,872.53 € 23.7 
1985 -1,238.93 € 8,028.20 € -0.05 
1990 9,513.61 € 1,520.42 € -1.2 
2000 68,001.82 € 8,590.70 € 6.3 
2011 83,101.30 € 19,042.25 € 4.3 
 596,051.23 € 143,364.66 €  
 739,415.89 € 50.65 ha 
Table 1: Buying costs and side costs of the implementation of Lake Bültsee conservation project (Euro 
values are given in nominal terms). In 1985, a marginal section of the conservation area was ceded for the 
implementation of an infrastructure project, resulting in a decrease in area, with the mentioned sale 
revenues and side costs. In 1990, parts of Lake Bültsee conservation area were sold, while in return a 
different conservation area was extended. This exchange resulted in the given positive buying and side costs. 
By giving the area as a leasehold to a third party contractor, SNSH was able to generate a leasehold income. 
From 1980 to 2008 the annual rent was zero, as it was considered that a rent would make the extensive management 
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of the area unprofitable (cp. Mewes et al. (2015) for costs of extensive grassland management). From 2009 
onwards a rent of 40 € per ha and year was charged (Table 2).  
 
administrative 
costs leasehold rent 
 per year total per ha 
1980-2008 1.042,00 € 0 € 0 € 
2009-2010 1.042,00 € 1.853,39 € 40,00 € 
2011-2015 1.042,00 € 2.025,71 € 40,00 € 
Table 2: Development of the annual management costs and rental income over time. 
From 1980 to 2015, the price of agricultural land has fluctuated strongly not only in Schleswig-Holstein but 
all over Germany. While in 1980 one hectare of agricultural land in the study region cost 14,240 €, the price 
dropped to 7,770 € in 1993 (Statistikamt Nord 2015). Since 2006, a sharp increase in prices for agricultural land 
in Schleswig-Holstein can be observed which is due in particular to the increasing cultivation of energy crops such 
as maize (Lupp et al. 2014; Dauber et al. 2016). This has resulted in an increase in prices for agricultural land to 
27,500 € per hectare in 2015. 
Based on the average agricultural land prices in Schleswig-Holstein, we estimate the land value of the conservation 
site around Lake Bültsee for each year. We assume that the land can be sold and reused for agricultural purposes 
to recoup the initial monetary outlay.1 
Following equation (1a), the resulting overall costs of the buy option are calculated by summing up the 
discounted buying and side costs for the individual purchasing transactions and subtracting the discounted 
leasehold income and the discounted value of acquired land. The values are calculated for each year during the 
case study timeframe and discounted from the respective year to the base year 1980. This allows us to evaluate the 
costs of the project from the beginning up to each year during that timeframe retrospectively. 
                                                          
 
1 Federal and European law, however, regulate withdrawal of land from extensive land use and consequential 
re-intensification (e.g. DGLG of 2013 in Schleswig-Holstein). Additionally, SNSH does not plan to sell or re-
intensify any of the area around Lake Bültsee. See section 4 for a discussion of the influence of greening 
regulations. 
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2.4 Costs of the compensation option 
2.4.1 Cost function 
The costs of buying relevant agricultural area and managing it internally are to be compared with the 
hypothetical costs of implementing a compensation scheme with an identical conservation outcome. We assume 
that a certain conservation target can be achieved through identical conservation measures independently of the 
mode of governance, in turn causing only different cost patterns (cp. Muradian and Rival 2012 and Schöttker et 
al. 2016). Furthermore, we assume that each landowner is, in principle, willing to participate in a scheme, if offered 
a compensation payment which at least covers the costs of participation, i.e. the foregone profit due to extensive 
management as prescribed by the scheme plus additional transaction costs due to participation and implementation 
(Defrancesco et al. 2008; Franzén et al. 2016; Greiner 2016). For simplicity, we ignore the possibility of 
landowners to use the bargaining power they obtain if their participation is crucial for the success of the 
conservation measure (cp. Discussion). In addition to the costs for compensation, the agency faces a certain amount 
of transaction costs including personnel expenses, travel expenses, and monitoring and enforcement costs 
(McCann 2013). 
The total costs for the hypothetical compensation scheme from year 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 to a given end-year 𝑇, expressed in 
values of the year 𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 , can thus be calculated with equation (3) with  𝑓𝑡  the area in hectares receiving 
compensation, 𝑐𝑝𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  the homogeneous compensation payment, and 𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
 the transaction costs borne by the 
agency, all in year 𝑡. 
𝐶𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤 =  ∑ 𝑑𝑡  𝑓𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡
 𝑐𝑝𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  (1 + 𝑡𝑡
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦)                                        (3) 
The compensation payment 𝑐𝑝𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  paid in the scheme is determined with equation (4) where 𝜋𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 is the potential 
profit per hectare agricultural land under intensive management, 𝜋𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡 the hypothetical profit with (the prescribed) 
extensive grassland management, and 𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟
 the transaction costs borne by the farmer for participating in the 
scheme.  
𝑐𝑝𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ = (𝜋𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑡)(1 + 𝑡𝑡
𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟).                                                      (4) 
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According to Falconer (2000) and McCann (2013) the agency level transaction costs as well as the farm level 
transaction costs are measured as a proportion of the compensation payment 𝑐𝑝𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ .  
2.4.2 Hypothetical costs of compensating farmers for conservation 
For the profit maximising intensive land use we assume that land in the conservation area around Lake Bültsee 
is cultivated with the average land use pattern for crop production in Schleswig-Holstein. Thus, we assume the 
land is cultivated with a mixture of field crops according to the four most common field crops grown in Schleswig-
Holstein – i.e. wheat, barley, maize and rapeseed – during the study case timeframe. According to our interviews 
we assume that from 2009 onwards the crop cultivation pattern transitions towards the more common and more 
profitable maize production. This is at least true in the study area, where most of the agricultural fields, and 
especially the fields surrounding the conservation area are cultivated with maize as an energy crop. Thus, from 
2009 to 2015 maize is assumed to be the sole crop cultivated in the conservation area under profit-maximising 
land use. From 2006 to 2008 we assume a transition period in which the share of maize cultivation increases and 
the shares of the other three crops decrease. 
Based on data on yield per hectare, crop prices and cultivation costs (Ruhr-Stickstoff Aktiengesellschaft 1974; 
Ruhr-Stickstoff Aktiengesellschaft 1988; Hydro Agri Dülmen GmbH 1993; KTBL 2005; KTBL 2009; KTBL 
2014) we estimate the average profit and cost from intensive agriculture with the corresponding field crops. 
We estimate for the potential profit in the hypothetical compensation scheme a revenue between 90 € and 160 
€ from the sale of cattle and/or dairy products per ha extensive grassland, costs of between around 310 € to 500 € 
per ha, and a total profit per hectare in the range from -200 € to -340 €. Our calculations show that over time, the 
corresponding profitability of extensive grassland measures varies but is negative throughout the whole study case 
timeframe, meaning that extensive grassland measures are, from the farmer’s perspective, not economically 
attractive and need subsidies (cp. Mewes et al. 2015). 
Additional to production and management costs, transaction costs contribute a substantial share to the overall 
cost of the compensation option. We take average values based on literature (Falconer 2000; McCann 2013), and 
assume that the farmers’ transaction costs amount for 10% of the actual compensation payment, and the agencies 
transaction costs contribute 15% of the compensation payment.  
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2.5 Baseline scenario and sensitivity analysis 
To analyse the costs of the case study we define a baseline scenario with a combination of average cost 
parameters. We then modify each parameter individually to assess possible causes for payment changes and show 
the management alternatives sensitivity towards parameter variation. This is done by creating high and low values 
for the parameters of transaction costs, leasehold payments and land value factor 𝜃 (Table 3 and section 3). To 
analyse the impact of the unprecedented increase in land prices on the cost-effectiveness of the two options – 
driven by the increase in energy crop production in the study region since 2006 – we estimate the hypothetical 
outcome of the management options with and without this boom in the energy crop sector. 
sensitivity 
analysis parameter  description  
low scenario 
value  
baseline scenario 
value high scenario  value  
1 
transaction 
costs farmers 
as a fraction of the 
offered compensation 
payment 
0.05 0.1 0.15 
 
transaction 
costs agency 0.1 0.15 0.2 
      
2 
leasehold 
payment  
0 € per hectare 
and year 
0 € per hectare and 
year from 1980 to 
2008, and 40 € per 
hectare and year 
from 2009 to 2015 
average leasehold 
payment for agricultural 
land in Schleswig-
Holstein 
      
3 
land value 
factor 𝜃 
grassland/ intensive 
cropland price ratio 0.4 0.7 1.0 
      
4 
energy crop 
boom 
assuming, the 
development of energy 
crop sector expansion did 
not happen  
transition in 
cultivated crops 
from crop mix to 
full maize 
cultivation 
no transition in 
cultivated crops to full 
maize cultivation; 
average, federal state 
level cultivation pattern 
Table 3: Parameter values for different sensitivity analyses, with corresponding low, baseline and high 
scenario values. 
Sensitivity analysis 1 considers variations of the baseline scenario value for transaction costs. The transaction 
costs are included into our calculations in equations (3) and (4), either being borne by the farmer or the agency. 
Literature suggests that overall transaction costs for agri-environment schemes vary between 14% and 40% of the 
compensation payment (Falconer 2000; McCann and Easter 2000; Kersten 2008; Thomas et al. 2009; McCann 
2013). We thus assume low and high values in this range and individually vary farmer’s and agency’s transaction 
costs to 0.05 above and below the baseline scenario values of 0.1 for the farmers and 0.15 for the agency. 
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The actual leasehold rent that BW pays to SNSH is only a small fraction of what is paid on average for 
agricultural land or even extensive grassland in Schleswig-Holstein. We therefore also calculate the sensitivity of 
our results to changes in the leasehold rent which is considered in eq. (1a). For the low value we assume zero rent 
to be paid as was the case prior to 2008, while the high value is assumed to be the average values for leasehold 
rents in Schleswig-Holstein. 
We assume that the value of extensive grassland is proportional to the value of intensive agricultural land (see 
eq. (2)). Ciaian et al. (2010) suggest for this proportion a value of 𝜃 = 0.7 in Central Europe. We take this as the 
value for the baseline scenario case and vary it to 0.4 and 1.0 in sensitivity analysis 3 as estimates for weaker and 
stronger proportional relations. This is equivalent for SNSH being able to sell the extensive grassland either to the 
full market price for intensive agricultural land (𝜃 = 1.0), or to a reduced price (𝜃 = 0.4) (cf. eq. 2). 
In our baseline scenario the expansion of the energy crop sector with resulting increases in agricultural land 
prices and product prices is considered. Since 2006, land prices in Schleswig-Holstein have more than tripled and 
income from intensive agricultural land use has risen steeply as well. As this development could not have been 
anticipated when the conservation project was initially set up in 1980, we analyse the sensitivity towards ignoring 
the effects of the energy crop boom and thus keep land prices and product prices fixed after the year 2006. As a 
result, we get a comparison between the actual development and a potential uninfluenced economic situation. As 
this is highly speculative, we do not implement any further price adaptation (e.g. due to inflation) and thus leave 
all cost parameters except product, land prices and leasehold rents unchanged. 
3 Results 
3.1 Results of the baseline scenario 
We find, for the baseline scenario, that between 1980 and 2004, the costs of the buy option exceeded the 
potential costs of the compensation option (Figure 2), whereas from 2004 onwards the costs of the compensation 
option were higher than the costs of the buy option. This result can be easily explained, as for long-term 
investments one-time transaction costs (e.g. side costs) are lower on a per annum basis than for short-term projects. 
In the short-run, high one-time transaction costs make the buy option relatively unattractive. In the case study, this 
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result is additionally driven by the development of agricultural land prices, which decreased significantly between 
1980 and 1993 and thus would have caused high losses, if land had been sold during or shortly after this period.  
 
Figure 2: Cumulative discounted costs of the buy option (straight line) and the compensation option 
(dashed line) for the baseline scenario value between 1980 and 2015. The values are discounted to the base 
year 1980. 
3.2 Sensitivity analysis 
3.2.1 Transaction costs 
The sensitivity analysis for the transaction costs results in a cost range of the compensation option. This is 
caused by a change in transaction costs borne by the conservation agency and compensation payments which 
include compensation for transaction costs of the farmer (see eqs. (3) and (4)). Although transaction costs make 
up only a small fraction of the total costs of the compensation option, changes in those costs have a substantial 
impact on predating (from 2004 to 1995) or postponing (from 2004 to 2008) the point where the buy option 
becomes more cost-effective than the compensation option, henceforth referred to as critical point. 
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Figure 3: Costs of the buy option (dashed line), and compensation option (straight line) with the 
corresponding bandwidth for compensation costs (grey shaded area) due to variations in transaction costs 
(high value is at the upper edge; low value is at the lower edge of the shaded area). The values are discounted 
to the base year 1980. 
3.2.2 Leasehold rent 
Unsurprisingly, if we assume high values for leasehold rent, the buy option gets more attractive as the agency 
can generate higher income from giving the land as a leasehold to a contractor. Consequently, the timeframe in 
which the compensation option outperforms the buy option is shortened, shifting the critical point forward to the 
year 1993 (Figure 4). The low value scenario with no leasehold payment has hardly any effect. Differences in the 
baseline scenario only start in 2008 and due to the small differences between the two scenarios the advantage of 
the buy option is only marginally reduced between 2009 and 2015 compared to the baseline scenario. 
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Figure 4: Costs of the buy option (dashed line), and compensation option (straight line) with the 
corresponding bandwidth for buying costs (grey shaded area) due to variations in the leasehold rent (high 
value is at the lower edge; low value is barely visible as it is very close to the actual, already very low lease 
hold rents). The values are discounted to the base year 1980. 
3.2.3 Land value factor 
Over the whole project timeframe, the land value varies significantly (Figure 5). This variation is amplified 
in the high value case and dampened in the low value case.  It shows that with a decreasing value of 𝜃 the costs 
for the buy option rise (upper bound of the grey shaded area) as the land value decreases and thus can only be sold 
at a low price at the end of the conservation project (see eq. (1)). Hence, the critical point is postponed to the year 
2007. For increasing values of 𝜃, which implies an increase in the land value und thus a decrease in the costs of 
the buy option, this critical point is already reached in 1996 (see lower bound of the grey shaded area). Beyond 
that, in the preceding project run time between 1980 and 1996, the difference between both options is marginal 
with higher levels of 𝜃. For sufficiently high values of 𝜃, the buy option would always be preferable over the 
compensation option. However, even higher values of 𝜃 = 1  are less reasonable, as they would represent a 
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situation in which formerly extensive grassland could be sold for higher prices as intensive agriculture land, thus 
being essentially overvalued. 
Rising land prices explain the growing advantage of the buy option over the compensation option in the last 
years of the project (since 2004). However, it is more likely that 𝜃 is in the range of 0.4 to 0.7 thus resulting in 
postponement of the critical point.  
 
Figure 5: Costs of the buy option (dashed line), and compensation option (straight line) with the 
corresponding bandwidth for buying costs (grey shaded area) due to variations in the land value factor 𝜽 
(high value is at the lower edge; low value is at the upper edge of the shaded area). The values are discounted 
to the base year 1980. 
3.2.4 No energy crop boom 
Figure 6 shows that under the assumption that an energy crop boom did not occur and, as a result, land and 
product prices have been more stable in the study area since 2006 (the start of the energy crop boom), the cost-
effectiveness advantage of the buy option compared to the compensation option is strongly reduced in comparison 
to the baseline scenario. This is plausible under this scenario, because land prices do not rise as strongly as in the 
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baseline scenario which reduces the potential revenue from selling land at the end of the conservation project. This 
in turn increases the overall costs of the buy option. A further effect in this sensitivity analysis is that the potential 
revenue from extensive and intensive agricultural measures is reduced by lower agricultural product prices (see 
eq. (1a)). This causes a reduction in the costs of the compensation option as compensation payments decrease (see 
eq. (4)). If agricultural product prices fall, intensive agriculture is less profitable, hence the opportunity costs of an 
extensive management scheme decrease, causing the compensation payments to decrease as well. Consequentially, 
both cost developments are closer to each other from 2006 onwards indicating a decreased superiority of the buy 
option.  
 
Figure 6: Costs of the buy option (dashed line) and compensation option (straight line) with the 
corresponding bandwidths (grey shaded areas) due to a hypothetically non-existing energy crop boom and 
thus decreased land and produce prices. The values are discounted to the base year 1980. 
4 Summary and Discussion 
Our research objective was to assess the cost-effectiveness of two modes of governance for an area of 
conservation interest and the resulting management options implemented on this area for a case study. We 
considered as modes of governance that (1) a conservation agency buys desired areas of interest and implements 
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conservation measures itself or through closely monitored firms (buy option), and (2) an agency offers payments 
to landowners to incentivise them to voluntarily preserve or create habitat on the areas of interest (compensation 
option). Our case study looks at the implementation of extensive grassland measures around the oligotrophic Lake 
Bültsee in a Natura 2000 area in Northern Germany from 1980 to 2015 aimed at reducing the nutrient inflow from 
the surrounding agricultural areas. We find that the buy option outperforms the compensation option in the long 
run from 2004 onwards. In the short run however, the compensation option is the superior mode of governance. 
This result is driven by the fact that the one-time costs of buying land, i.e. the buying and selling side costs, 
dominate the cost structure in the short run and obviously can only be offset after a significantly long project 
runtime. Land price fluctuations were a further key factor. Extensive parts of the conserved area were bought at 
relatively high prices in the 1980s, while prices dropped steeply in the 1990s. This implies that the low prices in 
the 1990s had a negative effect on the cost-effectiveness performance of the buy option in comparison to the 
compensation option. This trend, however, was reversed after land prices increased substantially from 2006 
onwards. 
We made a few assumptions in our case study that require discussion. First, we assumed that the mode of 
governance in practice does not change the possible conservation results. We assume that, ceteris paribus, the 
different modes of governance only result in different cost structures and thus total project costs, while still being 
able to result in the same ecological outcome. This assumption is necessary to allow a proper comparison between 
the two alternative governance choices in terms of their cost-effectiveness. Whether this assumption holds in 
reality is however an open question. Conservation organisations that buy land tend to keep and manage their 
properties for long time periods, and thus have a corresponding planning horizon for their conservation targets and 
the resulting implementation of measures (Theobald et al. 2000; Groves et al. 2002). Compensation-based projects, 
on the other hand, require more flexibility as potential participants can decide on a short-term basis whether to 
participate in a programme or not. Moreover, conservation funding, if spent annually, is more easily cut if the 
political or economic circumstances become less favourable for biodiversity conservation. This leads to a different 
planning horizon and may consequently result in different conservation targets and measures for such projects 
with different ecological outcomes. 
We assumed further that the landowners are willing to participate in conservation measures with certainty, if 
it is profit-maximising for them. We made this assumption to ensure that the intended conservation target can be 
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reached. However, this might be different in reality. The willingness to participate in nature conservation schemes 
depends, among other factors, on former experience with conservation projects, programme objectives, and 
environmental attitude, but also on participants’ expectations of potentially permanent changes in the usability of 
their land due to implementation of measures (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; Moon and Cocklin 2011; 
Yeboah et al. 2015; Unay Gailhard and Bojnec 2015; Greiner 2016) and certainly varies between conservation 
projects, timing and location (Vanslembrouck et al. 2002). Therefore, land owners on potential conservation areas 
might not at all or only temporarily be willing to participate in a compensation scheme with resulting negative 
ecological impacts (Van Teeffelen et al. 2012; Schöttker et al. 2016). 
A somewhat different but related case arises if land owners are, in principle, willing to participate in a 
conservation project, and realise that their land is crucial for the realisation of the project. In this case farmers may 
act strategically and try to capture so-called information rents (Ferraro 2008 ) by overstating the opportunity costs 
of participation and requesting higher compensation payments or purchasing prices for their land (Prazan and 
Theesfeld 2014; Daniele et al. 2015; Banerjee et al. 2016; Kuhfuss et al. 2016). To what extent this farmer-side 
strategic behaviour is prevalent in the study area and to what extent it can be counteracted by agency-side behaviour 
such as risk reduction through trust-building remains an open question. 
German and European legislation allows intensification of extensively used grassland only under certain 
conditions (referred to as greening), e.g. the provision of appropriate compensation areas (see DGLG 2013 for 
Schleswig-Holstein). A complete intensification prohibition is only in place in Natura 2000 and FFH-areas, both 
of which apply to the Bültsee area. Therefore, our assumption that the area used in the project can easily be sold 
and used intensively only reflects the real life situation to a limited extent. However, according to its bylaws, 
SNSH is, in principle, allowed to sell every part of its conservation areas if compensation areas are developed in 
return. If, therefore, it were necessary or opportune to sell the land at Lake Bültsee for ecological, environmental 
or economic reasons, this would be possible as long as compensation areas are provided. Against this background, 
a re-intensification of the project area is at least difficult under existing law, however a potential sale is possible. 
This obviously might lead to reduced land prices. We account for this in our analysis by introducing the land value 
factor 𝜃 = 0.7 for the case study calculations, representing the price ratio of extensive and intensive agricultural 
land prices.  
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When selecting between the buy option and the compensation option in the real world, aspects other than those 
considered in this paper play a role as well. For example, monitoring and enforcement of compliance with the 
prescribed conservation measure seem to be easier in the buy option. There is no need for compliance monitoring 
if the conservation agency carries out the conservation activities by itself and it seems rather easy if the agency 
selects a firm with an intrinsic interest in conservation, as with Bunde Wischen e.V. in our case study. In contrast, 
if landowners without an intrinsic motivation carry out the conservation measures, the importance and hence the 
costs of monitoring and enforcement measures increases (Wätzold and Schwerdtner 2005). Another relevant aspect 
is the land owners’ acceptance of the two options. German farmers seem to have a strong preference for the 
compensation option as selling the land to a conservation agency implies that it is taken away “irreversibly” from 
agricultural use (Beer 2016). 
Generalising insights from a case study is always only possible to a limited extent, and the assessment of the 
cost-effective mode of governance of conservation projects comparable to our case study is an empirical issue and 
requires a detailed examination of the specific economic and ecological conditions of the case study. However, we 
are able to identify a few patterns that allow some careful generalisations. One-time transaction costs of land 
purchase and sale are high which suggests that – ceteris paribus – the cost-effectiveness of the buy option increases 
in comparison to the compensation option with the planned duration of the conservation project. Note that 
although, in principle, long-term conservation is desired from an ecological perspective, conservation takes place 
in a dynamic world where aspects such as climate change and changing socio-economic conditions may call for a 
re-allocation of conservation areas (Van Teeffelen et al. 2012; Van Teeffelen et al. 2014) implying the need to sell 
conserved land. Our case study also draws attention to the general importance of changes in land prices (cp. 
Carwardine et al. (2010) as an example of research on future cost uncertainty) and their impact on the cost-
effectiveness comparison of the buy option and the compensation option. The drop in agricultural land prices in 
the 1990s substantially extended the cost-effectiveness advantage of the compensation option in those years and 
if the increase in land price due to the boom in energy crops had not occurred, the cost-effectiveness advantage of 
the buy option from 2004 onwards would have been much smaller. 
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